RUSH: From the New York Times, get this story. "Repeated polling has found a racial gap in the races for mayor and comptroller: black voters are far more likely than white voters to view Mr. Spitzer and Mr. Weiner favorably, and more likely to say they deserve a second chance. And the statistical evidence is reinforced on the campaign trail: last week, for example, the predominantly black audience at a mayoral forum in Laurelton, Queens, cheered Mr. Weiner and jeered at another candidate, George T. McDonald, a Republican, who called Mr. Weiner a 'freak.'"
What's so hard to comprehend about it? They called the guy a Republican. People in New York are going to jeer a Republican and they're going to cheer somebody like Weiner and next they're going to cheer somebody like Client Number 9. Weiner and Client Number 9 can do anything and be cheered in a New York audience if a Republican is also up there on the stage.
But it goes further: "Interviews with black ministers, political leaders, scholars and voters suggest two major factors at work: an emphasis in black congregations on forgiveness and redemption, and an experience, particularly among older black voters, of having seen their revered leaders embroiled in scandal." So this story makes the case that black voters don't care what Weiner did, what Spitzer did. They don't care, because they, in their churches and congregations, are devoted to forgiveness and redemption.
It's just amazing that they would even think to poll it this way, but they did. Blacks have no problem with Spitzer and Weiner. And that's not what it is. It's not that they don't have a problem with Spitzer and Weiner, it's that Spitzer and Weiner are Democrats and as far as black voters are concerned, Democrats can't do any wrong, not really. They don't care if Santa Claus is a pervert. They don't care if Santa Claus happens to be a philanderer. They don't care. What they care about is that a Republican might win. That's dangerous. That is unacceptable. These other guys, as long as they're Democrats, it doesn't matter.
Now, do you remember a Democrat wordsmith, a professor at the University of California, George Lakoff (rhymes with)? I'm sure you do. George Lakoff (rhymes with) was a guy, still is a guy, who advised Democrats on the way to structure their language on the political stump, the campaign trail and in ads in order to appeal to voters. Well, there's a story, Paul Bedard of the Washington Examiner uncovered a document of 80 pages, 80-page talking points titled "Preventing gun violence through effective messaging." And it's written by three Democrat political operatives. James Taranto at the Best of the Web today, the Wall Street Journal, also highlighted this, what Paul Bedard at the Washington Examiner had found.
When you go through this, what you have here is the Democrat playbook in print, in black and white. I guess the way to characterize this, what they're attempting to do is incite moral panic. They want moral panic. That is the way that Democrats are being advised to reach voters. This is how they're reaching the young and this is how they're reaching women. Now, what's interesting is if you read this thing, you quickly figure out something that you and I both know. They can't win in the arena of ideas. They cannot win a debate of their ideas versus ours.
So what they have to do is come up with fake imagery and words, if you will, to incite emotions to get their way. They do not even try to win a debate of ideas. The point of this 80-page talking points, it's called a monograph, written by these political operatives. The purpose is to teach Democrats how to engage in campaigns and the first thing that you come away with is do not go anywhere near real ideas. Don't debate them. Don't talk them about seriously. All they're to do here is package everything in a hyper moral sense. And it is said in this piece that it works best with women and 18 to 26-year-old young people.
Now, this particular story happens to be about guns. The Democrats are still trying to win the gun issue, which means taking yours away from you. Democrats winning the gun issue means getting rid of the Second Amendment, getting rid of the right to bear arms. This little manual here is a how-to manual in persuading people to agree that everybody else needs to get rid of their guns. They don't say it this way, but it's obviously very clear, don't even go near the right versus wrong of the Constitution. Don't go near any statistics about gun usage, don't even go near there. Strictly emotion. It instructs politicians and advocates to hype high-profile gun incidents, like Trayvon Martin, to win support for new gun control laws.
And as Taranto characterizes it, it is a how-to book on inciting moral panic. The do's and don't are consistent with this advice. "'When talking to broader audiences, we want to meet them where they are,' the authors advise. 'That means emphasizing emotion over policy prescriptions," or fixes. Don't talk policy. Don't use think-tank lingo. Don't talk about anything to do with policy and how to fix a problem. Don't talk about facts. Don't get into that. "Make the case simple and direct. Avoid arguments that leave people thinking they don't know enough about the topic to weigh in." The purpose of this is to overcome people, "Well, wait a minute, I don't know enough to decide." That's not going to be an obstacle if these people get their way.
For example, power language. In this how-to manual, this is what Democrats are being advised to say, three different things here. "It breaks my heart that every day in our country (state or city) children wake up worried and frightened about getting shot." Another one: "Just imagine the pain that a mother or father feels when their young child is gunned down." Another one: "The real outrage--the thing that makes this violence so unforgivable--is that we know how to stop it and we're not getting it done."
Now, those are three examples of effective ways to go out and talk to people and get them on your side to convince people to give up their guns. Here are examples of ineffective, as denoted by this manual. You are, as a Democrat, never to say anything like, "There's a clear body of research demonstrating the high social cost of gun violence." Never, ever talk that way. Do not say: "The policy outcomes we're after are the ones that can have the most beneficial impact on the rates of violence among the most affected populations." Don't even confuse people with that kind of talk.
Don't say this: "Of course, gun violence affects people's lives. But, it also has a devastating economic impact to the tune of over $100 billion a year. That's a number that should get every American taxpayer's attention." Except it doesn't. A hundred million dollars, nobody can contemplate losing it because nobody can contemplate having it. Nobody can contemplate spending it, because nobody ever has it. So their theory is, using big numbers and economic mumbo jumbo, you're not going to persuade anybody. But you emote and you talk about pain and you talk about suffering in these communities where this is happening and you position the gun as the sole reason people are suffering. You position the gun as the sole reason people are hurting. The gun is the reason for crime. The gun is the reason for death. The gun and the people who like them are the reason there's so much pain.
Now, James Taranto here says: "The campaign proved remarkably ineffective. A few states -- Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, New York -- enacted new antigun laws amid the post-Newtown panic. But it was hardly a national trend: Democratic Party dominance of state government was a necessary condition." So right now it's not working, but the manual, nevertheless, is an open book. Republican operatives, if they really want to differentiate themselves from Democrats, need to be looking at this because the Democrats have just admitted it here. Issues doesn't matter. Facts don't matter. Right and wrong doesn't matter. What we want is all that matters, and how can we make people feel the way they need to feel in order to agree with us? Total, 100% emotional manipulation, which, again, is called moral panic.